1149 - Accidents Involving Bulk Cargoes Not Specifically Listed In The Code Of Safe Practice For Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC CODE)

 

Ref. T3/1.01                                                                                                               MSC/Circ.1149

                                                                                                                                 15 December 2004

 

1            TheMaritimeSafetyCommittee,atitsseventy-ninthsession(1to10December,2004), considered  a  preliminary  report  on  an  explosion  during  the  transport  of  Hot  Briquetted  Iron/ DirectReducedIron(HBI/DRI)Finesasaresultofwhichthevesselconcernedwaslostandsix crew members were killed. In considering the report, the Committee:

 

.1        was  advised  of  other  accidents  involving  similar  cargoes,  which  may  evolve hydrogen  in  contact  with  water  and  may  heat  spontaneously  and  which  may  be described as:

 

Orinoco Iron Remet Fines; Remet Fines(HBI);

Orinoco Remet Fines in Bulk; or

HBI Fines;

 

.2      noted with concern the lack of proper information on the above-mentioned cargoes and that they are not specifically listed in the BCCode; and

 

.3      confirmedthat,forsafecarriageofthesecargoes,dueregardshouldbegivento the   relevant   general   precautions   in   the   BC   Code   and   in   particular   to   the appropriate  precautions  in  the  entries  for  “DIRECT REDUCED  IRON  (A) Briquettes,hot-moulded”andfor “DIRECTREDUCEDIRON(B)suchaslumps, pelletsandcold-mouldedbriquettes(nottobeconfusedwithironsponge,spent)”, notingthatthepropertiesofthesecargoesaresimilartothoseofdangerousgoods

of Class 4.3.

 

2            TheCommitteefurtherendorsedthedecisionsoftheDSCSub-Committeetocirculate the following DSC circulars (copies attached as annexes to this circular):

 

.1      DSC/Circ.26regardingincidentsinvolvingthetransportofZincIngotswherein  it was  noted  that,  possibly  due  to  the  presence  of  Zinc  Ashes  not  completely removedfromthesurfaceoftheingots,arsineaccumulatedinhighconcentrations inthecargoholdsandthusrecommendsprecautionsforthecarriageofthiscargo;

and

 

.2      DSC/Circ.27   detailing  an   explosion   in   a   cargo   hold   loaded   with  re-cycled aluminiumdescribedas “Serox”or “Oxiton”whichnotesthepossibleformation of gases such as hydrogen, ammonia and acetylene.

 

 

 3            The Committee, in view of the above,

 

.1      drewtheattention,onceagain,ofshippers,terminaloperators,shipowners,ship operators,companiesandcharterersinvolvedinthetransportofsolidbulkcargoes to:

 

.1       theneedtoprovidetheshipmasterwithallrelevantinformationonthecargo to  be  loaded  in  accordance  with  Chapters  VI  and  VII  of  the  SOLAS Convention, and the provisions of the BC Code; and

 

.2       the need, when transporting anysolid bulk cargo, to consult the BC Code;

 

.2      recommended to shippers and shipmasters:

 

.1       toensure,beforeloadinganysolidbulkcargo,thesuitabilityoftheholdand its equipment for the product to be transported;

 

.2       toensure,beforeloadinganysolidbulkcargo,thesuitability ofthecargo for transportation;

 

.3       toseekadvice,beforeloadinganysolidbulkcargonotspecificallylistedin the BC Code, fromthe competent authorities; and

 

.4       toonlycommenceloadingifalloftherelevantsafetycriteriacontainedin the BC Code are met;

 

.3      recommendedthatshipowners,shipoperatorsandcompaniesshouldensurethat shipmasters and crews involved in the transport of solid bulk cargoes are trained in theprovisionsoftheBCCode,includingthesafetymeasurescontainedtherein, and to incorporate theminto their safety management system procedure.

 

4            Member  Governments  are  invited  to  bring  the  above  information  to  the  attention  of shippers,terminaloperators,shipowners,shipoperators,companies,charterers,shipmastersand allotherpartiesconcernedrequestingthatappropriateactionbe  taken,takingintoaccountthe provisions of the relevant IMO instruments when transporting solid bulk cargoes.

 

 

 

                                                                                                                 ***

Annex 1

 

Ref. T3/1.01                                                                                                                    DSC/Circ.26

7 October 2004

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INCIDENTS INVOLVING TRANSPORT OF ZINC INGOTS

 

 

 

1          The  Sub-Committee  on  Dangerous  Goods,  Solid  Cargoes  and  Containers  (DSC),  at  its ninthsession(27Septemberto1October2004),consideredaninvestigationreportsubmittedby Italyonthreedifferentshipscarryingzincingots.Insidetheholdsoftheaboveshipsarsinewas accumulatedinhighconcentrations.Fourcrewmembersfeltillafterenteringintocargoholds and one of the crew members died in the local hospital.

 

Followinginvestigations,thecargopresentonboardoftheaboveshipswasrevealedto

be Zinc Ingots 98.5% pure or less GOB (good ordinary brand).

 

2          The  Italian  Maritime  Administration  has  issued  a  safety  guideline  which  requires  a specialatmosphere'stestinallcargoholdsonboardshipsloadedwithzincingots.Thesetestsare carriedoutbeforeopeningcargohatches,byacompetentchemist,inordertoguaranteethatthe atmosphere  inside  the  holds  is  safe  for  entry/work  during  opening  and  unloading  operations, taking into account the presence of toxic or flammable gases or other hazards.

 

3          The Sub-Committee's attention was drawn tothe conclusion of the investigation that:

 

.1        the first test on board of the first shiprevealed a concentration of arsine of 10 ppm. Such  tests  had  been  carried  out  around  a  week  after  the  accident  and  after  the holds  of  the  ship  had  been  left  open  for  some  time.                                                                       This  supposes  that  the concentrationofarsineintheatmosphereoftheclosedholdsatthetimeofentry

of the crew members was much higher than the 10 ppmstated above;

 

.2        afterwards  official  sanitary  reports  confirmed  that  the  arsine  (arsenic  hydride: AsH3),  evidently  present  in  the  holds  of  the  first  and  second  ships  in  higher concentrationincomparisontothethreshold'slimit,wasresponsibleforthedeath

of a sailor and the hospitalization of other crew members;

 

.3        thetestsonboardthethirdshiprevealedaconcentrationofarsineof3 ppminthe holds.   Precautionarytestsoftheportchemistavoidedanincidentonboardthis shipbecausethelevelofconcentrationofarsinewasalsointhiscase,dangerous

to the human health;

 

.4        the  above  report  shows  two  common  characteristics:  the  presence  of  arsine  and fresh water;

 

.5        the  development  of  arsine  was  possibly  due  to  the  presence  of  zinc  ash  not completely removed from the surface of ingots;

 

 

                 

.6        testscarriedoutonboardothershipscarryingonlyzincingotsof99.995%purity ormoreSHG(specialhighgrade)hadnotrevealedanydetectableconcentration of arsine inside the cargo holds.

 

4          It  is  therefore  recommended  that,  in  transporting  zinc  ingots  98.5%  pure  or  less  GOB (good ordinary brand), particular attention should be paid to the following:

 

.1         wet  cargo  should  not  be  loaded  and  weathertightness  of  hatches  should  be ensured;

 

.2         the cargo should be kept dry and not be handled during precipitation;

 

.3         suitablegasdetectorsforthemeasurementsofhydrogenandarsineand,atleast, two  sets  of  self-contained  breathing  apparatus,  additional  to  those  required  by regulation  II-2/10.10  of  the  1974  SOLAS  Convention,  as  amended,  should  be provided;

 

.4         continuous mechanical ventilation is required.  Ventilation should be such that any escaping gases cannot reach living quarters on or under deck;

 

.5         entryintotheholdswithoutwearingtheself-containedbreathingapparatusmust notbepermitteduntilventilationoftheholdshasbeencarriedoutandaftertests reveal no detectable concentration ofarsine/flammable gases inside the holds;

 

.6         testsmustbecarriedoutbeforeopeningcargohatches,byacompetentperson,in order  to  guarantee  that  the  atmosphere  inside  the  holds  is  safe  for  entry/work during  opening  and  unloading  operations,  taking  into  account  the  presence  of toxic or flammable gases or other hazards; and

 

.7         possibleignitionsourcesaswellashotwork,burning,smoking,electricalsparking should be eliminated during handling and transport.

 

5          Member  Governments  are  invited  to  bring  the  above  information  to  the  attention  of shipowners,  ship  operators,  companies,  shipmasters,  shippers  and  all  other  parties  concerned, requesting that appropriate action betaken when transporting such cargoes.

 

 

 

***

Annex 2

Ref. T3/1.01                                                                                                                    DSC/Circ.27

7 October 2004

 

 

EXPLOSION IN A CARGO HOLD LOADED WITH RECYCLED ALUMINIUM

 

 

1          The  Sub-Committee  on  Dangerous  Goods,  Solid  Cargoes  and  Containers  (DSC),  at  its ninthsession(27Septemberto1October2004),consideredthecasualtyreportoftheexplosion

in  a  cargo  hold  of  a  ship  which  occurred  on  2  December  2002,  resulting  in  injuries  to  crew members and the subsequent loss of the ship.

 

2          Atthetimeoftheaccident,theshipwascarryinganaluminiumoxidecargooriginating fromtheprocessingofrecycledaluminium(brand-named"Serox"or"Oxiton")whichisusedfor cementproduction.  Thiscargohadbeencarriedasnon-dangerousgoodssinceitsintroductionas

"Serox" or "Oxiton".

 

3          The  accident  was  reported  to  have  been  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  cargo  came  into contact  with  water  resulting  in  generation  of  flammable  gas  at  a  speed  which  resulted  in  the formationofanexplosiveair/gasmixtureinaclosedandpoorlyventilatedhold.   Throughthe investigation  of  the  casualty,  this  cargo  was  classified  as  a  class  4.3  product  under  UN.  3170 "ALUMINIUM  SMELTING  BY-PRODUCTS",  but  it  was  not  documented  as  such  by  the shipper.

 

4          Similaraccidentshaveoccurredinthepastandtopreventsuchaccidentswhencarrying thesecargoes,allrequirementsforthecarriageofdangerousgoodsshouldbestrictlyobserved,in particular:

                        

.1         requirementsofdocumentationforcargoasrequiredbyregulationVII/7-2ofthe SOLAS Convention;

 

 

.2	the general requirements of the BC Code; and
.3	requirements   of   the   entry   for   ALUMINIUM   SMELTING	BY-PRODUCTS

UN  3170  in  the  Code  of  Safe  Practice  for  Solid  Bulk  Cargoes  (BC  Code), including continuous mechanical ventilation.

 

5          The “Hazard”sectionoftheBCCodescheduleforUN3170indicatespossibleformation ofgassuchasHydrogen,AmmoniaandAcetylene.   Itshouldbenotedthatinthisincidentand othersofasimilarnaturethatthesmellofAmmonia,agas,wasnoticedduringcargooperations. ThepresenceofAmmoniawouldgenerallyindicatethepresenceofadditionalgaseswhichmay be  flammable.   It  is  therefore  advisable  that  if  Ammonia  is  found  present,  suitable  preventive measures are taken as further outlined.

 

6          Member  Governments  are  invited  to  bring  the  above  information  to  the  attention  of shipowners,  ship  operators,  companies,  shipmasters,  shippers  and  all  other  parties  concerned, requesting that appropriate action betaken when transporting such cargoes.

 

• Informatietype: Internationaal
• Documentsoort: Circulaire niet in wetten.nl
• Toegangsrechten: Extern
• Identificatie: PUC_1892_14
• Versie: 1
• Datum beschikbaarheid: 07-11-2007
• Geldigheid van: 15-12-2004
• Wijzigingsdatum: 24-11-2016
• Titel: 1149 - Accidents Involving Bulk Cargoes Not Specifically Listed In The Code Of Safe Practice For Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC CODE)
• Organisatie: International Maritime Organization (IMO)
• Taal: Nederlands
• Onderwerp: Veiligheid / Safety
• Hoofdtaak: Koopvaardij / Merchant Shipping
• Thema: Zeevaart / Seagoing ships / Information / IMO Instruments (Informative) / Circulars (Informative) / MSC Circulars (Informative) / 1100 until 1199