Onderwerp: Bezoek-historie

995 - Advice On The Dangers Of Flooding Forward Compartments
Geldigheid:06-11-2001 t/m Status: Geldig vandaag

Dit onderwerp bevat de volgende rubrieken.

 

Ref. T1/10                                                                                                                     MSC/Circ.955

23 June 2000

1          The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-second session (17 to 26 May 2000), considered the servicing intervals of inflatable liferafts, inflatable lifejackets, marine evacuation systems, inflated rescue boats,hydrostaticreleaseunitsandsatelliteEPIRBs,requiredbyregulationsIII/20.8,III/20.9andIV/15.9 ofthe1974SOLASConvention,asamended,aswellasregulationsI/8andI/9ofthe1988SOLAS Protocol on the HSSC.

 

 

Theservicingintervalsoftheaforementionedlife-savingappliancesandsatelliteEPIRBsrequiredby SOLAS regulations III/20.8, III/20.9 and IV/15.9,respectively,shallnotexceed12monthswhichmaybe extended  to  17  months  where  in  any  case  this  is  impracticable  in  exceptional  circumstances.  In  the meantime, according to regulations I/8 and I/9 of the 1988 SOLAS Protocol, the said appliances shall be subjectedtoanannualoraperiodicalsurveywithin3monthsbeforeoraftereachanniversaryoftheCargo ShipSafetyEquipmentCertificateandoftheCargoShipSafetyRadioCertificate,respectively,orthe Cargo Ship Safety Certificate,i.e. maximum 18 months interval.

 

 

2          TheCommitteenotedthatthereisadifferencebetweentherelevantregulationsofchaptersIIIand IVofthe1974SOLASConvention,asamended,andregulationsI/8andI/9ofthe1988SOLASProtocol intermsofservicingintervals,whichcreatesinconvenienceandburdenbothforshipoperatorsandfor Administrations which are implementing the HSSC.

 

 

3          TheCommitteealsonotedthatthe1988SOLASProtocolenteredintoforceon3February 2000 andresolutionA.883(21)“GlobalandUniformImplementationoftheHarmonizedSystemofSurveyand Certification(HSSC)”wasadopted,inNovember1999,enablingtheprovisionsoftheHSSCtobe implemented internationally.

 

 

4          The Committee, in pursuance of theHSSC's objectives to “simplify survey requirements, thereby reducing the burden on Administrations, operators of ships and the crews of ships”, decided that:

 

“theservicingintervalsoflife-savingappliancesandradiocommunicationequipmentforships,whose flagStatesimplementtheHSSC,maybeinconcertwiththetermsoftheHSSCannual,periodical and renewal survey stipulated in the 1988 SOLAS Protocol notwithstanding regulations III/20.8, III/20.9 and IV/15.9 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, as amended”.

 

 

5          Member Governments are invited toapplytheabovedecisionwhenconductingrelevantsurveys and port State control on ships, whose flag States implement the HSSC.

 

Annex

ADVICE ON THE DANGERS OF FLOODING OF FORWARD COMPARTMENTS

 

 

 

ThecapesizeOilBulkOreCarriermvDerbyshiresankoffOkinawainTyphoonORCHIDin September1980withthelossof44lives.  Thecauseofhersinkingremainedamysteryuntil1994when, usingmoderndeep-seaunderwatertechniquesanexpeditionlocatedthewreck.Thispreliminaryexpedition ledtoadetailedsurveyofthewreckin1997whichrevealedaspectsofthesinkingthatshowed-after subsequent research using testingtank models,thattheinitialcauseofsinkingwasprogressivefloodingof forward spaces.

 

 

TheDerbyshireinitiallysuffereddamagetotheairpipesservingtheforepeaktankandtheforward bosun'sstore.  Thedamagewasattributedtotheimpactofheavyseasonairpipesand,possibly,the displacement of the starboard windlass, which then caused further damage.

 

 

Theresearchthatwascommissionedsubsequenttothefindingsatthewrecksiteshowedthatlarge volumesofwatercanbetakeninthroughdamagedairpipesofthesizeandtypetypicallyfittedtobulk carriersandtankerstoserveforwardtanks.Floodingratesinexcessof400cubicmetresperhourthrough

a single 300 mm air pipe were found to be possible in relatively heavy but by no means extreme seas.

 

 

Floodingoftheforepeakandtheforwardballasttankthroughairpipescausedtheshiptotrimby theheadandreducetheeffectivebowheight.Statisticalanalysisoftanktestresultsindicatedthat,although therewasalowprobabilityoftheshipmeetingahatch-breakingwaveinherintactcondition,areductionin bowheightofaslittleas1.1mcouldleadtoa70%probabilityofencounteringahatch-breaking wave (dependingonspeed,etc).ThehatchcoversofNos.1and2cargoholdssubsequentlyfailedallowingrapid flooding of those spaces.  The ship was then ina condition beyond its survival capability.

 

 

Theevidenceconsideredbytheinvestigationindicatedthattheseeventstookplacerapidly.  There wasnoevidencethat  anyattempttoabandonshiphadbeenpossible.   Theeventstookplacealmost certainlyatnightanditwasconcludedthatinsuchcircumstancestheship'screwwouldhavebeenunlikely to have detected the impending disastrous circumstances until the shipwas already doomed.

 

 

Masters  -particularly those who sail on large ships where the bridge is remote from the forward spaces-needtobeespeciallyvigilantthattheweathertightintegrityoftheirshipisfullymaintained.  After initial battening down,regularchecksshouldbemadetodetectanyreductionintheintegrityoftheclosing arrangements.  In particular:

 

 

-           Spacesthatareenteredonroutinebasisshouldbesubjecttoacarefulcheckaftertheiruse

to ensure that watertight integrity is fully restored.

 

 

-           Ropeandotherhatchesshouldhavetheirfixingarrangementscheckedtocompensatefor any slackening of toggles or other fixing devices.

 

 

-           Bilges and tanks should be regularly sounded and any ingress of water investigated.

 

 

             

-           Where bilge alarms are fitted, they should be regularly tested.

 

 

-           Pumpingarrangementsinforwardspacesshouldberegularlycheckedforoperational effectiveness.

 

 

Ownersofshipswithoutbilgealarmsinremoteforwardspacesshouldconsiderfittingsuchdevices with audible and visual indication on the bridge.

 

 

Mastersshouldconsiderearlyevasiveactionintheeventthatsevereweathersystemsapproachthe regioninwhichtheshipisnavigating.  Dueregardshouldbehadtothehandlingcharacteristicsoftheship andanylimitationsofcontrolthatmayleadtotheshipbeingdangerouslyexposedtotheforcesofsuch extreme weather.

 

 

Masters  should  keep  owners  or  managers  advised  when  weather  conditions  deteriorate necessitatingevasiveaction.  Suchadviceshouldincludeposition,courseandspeedandshouldbegiven morefrequentlyinproportiontotheseverityoftheweatherandthelimitationsimposedontheship's progress.

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