Onderwerp: Bezoek-historie

623 REVOKED Piracy and armed robbery against ships
Geldigheid:18-06-1993 t/m 23-06-2009Status: Was geldig

Dit onderwerp bevat de volgende rubrieken.

Revokes MSC/Circ.622 EIF = June 23rd 2009
Guidance to shipowners And ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships ( SUA 1988 (Refer to the footnote to MSC/Circ. 443 above ) )

1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its sixty-second session (24 to 25 May 1993), considered

the report of the Working Group on the Malacca Strait Area (MSC 62IINF.3), which covered

piracy and armed robbery against ships in that area and elsewhere in the world, as necessary, as

well as the enhancement of safety of navigation and consequentially protection of the marine

environment through the Strait.


2 The Committee approved the report and, inter alia, decided that the guidance contained in the

report aimed at shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews he circulated to Member

Governments requesting them to communicate it to those concerned and invited Governments and

international organizations concerned to comment on the guidance before the next (sixty-third)

session of the Committee in May 1994, so that MSC 63 can take account of their comments in

reviewing the text before issuing a comprehensive IMO publication containing guidance on

preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery.


3 Pursuant to the Committee's instruction, the guidance given at annex is brought to the

attention of Member Governments and organizations in consultative status with IMO, inviting

them to take action as recommended in paragraph 2 above.

Annex Protection of merchant ships against pirates and armed robbers


1 This circular aims at bringing to the attention of shipowners, masters and crews the precautions to be taken to reduce the risks of piracy on the high seas and armed robbery against ships at anchor, off ports or when underway through a coastal State's territorial waters. It outlines steps that should be taken to reduce the risk of such attacks, possible responses to them and the vital need to report attacks. both successful and unsuccessful, to the authorities of the relevant coastal State and to the ships' own maritime Administration. Such reports are to be made as soon as possible, even if such acts are only thought likely, to enable necessary action to be taken.

2 These recommendations have been culled from a number of sources. Where conflicting advice has been apparent, the reason for choosing the recommended course has been stated. The pirates objective

3 The main targets of the South East Asian attacker appear to be cash in the ship's safe, crew possessions and any other portable ship's equipment, even including coils of rope. When there has been evidence of tampering with containers, it has been suggested that the raiders may initially have gained access when the ship was berthed in port and then gone over the side, with what they could carry. Thorough checking of ships' compartments and securing before leaving ports is therefore recommended.

Reducing the temptation for piracy

Cash in the ship's safe

4 The belief that large sums of cash are carried in the master's safe attracts attackers. On several occasions this belief has been justified and substantial sums have been stolen. While carrying cash may sometimes be necessary to meet operational needs and crew requirements and to overcome exchange control restrictions in some States, it acts as a magnet for attackers and they will intimidate the master or crew members until the locations have been revealed, Shipowners should consider ways of eliminating the need to carry large sums of cash on board ship. When this need arises because of exchange control restrictions imposed by States, the matter should be referred to the ship's maritime Administration to consider if representations should be made to encourage a more flexible approach as part of the international response to eliminate attacks by pirates and armed robbers.

Smaller crews

5 The smaller crew numbers now found on board ships also favour the attacker. A small crew engaged in ensuring the safe navigation of their ship through congested or confined waters will have the additional onerous task of maintaining high levels of security surveillance for prolonged periods. Shipowners will wish to consider enhancing security watchers if their ship is in waters or at anchor off ports, where attacks occur. Shipowners will wish to consider providing appropriate surveillance and detection equipment to aid their crews and protect their ships. Shipowners should seek to verify the bona fide of any security personnel they may engage locally.

Recommended practices

6 The recommended practices outlined below are based on reports of incidents, advice published by commercial organizations and measures developed to enhance ship security. The extent to which the recommendations are followed or applied are matters solely for the owners or master of vessels operating in areas where attacks occur.

7 The recommended actions are defined as phases related to any voyage in a piracy threat area. The phases define the main stages in all situations of non-piracy, attempted piracy and confirmed piracy. Depending on the development of anyone situation, they mayor may not materialize.

The pre-piracy phase -Anti-attack plan

8 All ships operating in waters where attacks occur should have an anti-attack plan. The anti-attack plan should be prepared having regard to the risks that may be faced, the crew members available, their capability and training, the ability to establish secure areas on board ship and the surveillance and detection equipment that has been provided. The plan should, inter alia, cover:
    .1 the need for enhanced surveillance and the use of lighting, surveillance and detection equipment;

    .2 crew responses, if a potential attack is detected or an attack is underway;

    .3 the radio alarm procedures to be followed; and

    .4 the reports that must be made after an attack or an attempted attack. Anti-attack plans must ensure that masters and crews are made fully aware of the risks involved during attacks by pirates or armed robbers. In particular, they should address the dangers that may arise if a crew adopts an aggressive response to an attack. Early detection of a possible attack is the most effective deterrent. Aggressive responses, once an attack is underway and, in particular, once the attackers have boarded the ship, could significantly increase the risk to the ship and those on board.

    Routing and delaying anchoring

    9 If at all possible, ships should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to have taken place and, in particular, seek to avoid bottle-necks. If ships are approaching ports where attacks have taken place on ships at anchor. rather than vessels underway. and it is known that the ship will have to anchor off port for some time. consideration should be given to delaying anchoring by slow steaming or longer routing to remain well off shore thereby reducing the period during which the ship will be at risk. Charter party agreements should recognize that ships may need to delay arrival at ports where attacks occur either when no berth is available for the ship or offshore loading or unloading will be delayed for a protracted period.

    Practice the anti-attack plan

    10 Prior to entering an area. where attacks have occurred. the ship's crew should have practiced and perfected the procedures set down in the ship's anti-attack plan. Alarm signals and procedures should have been thoroughly practiced. If instructions are to be given over the ship's address systems or personal radios. they must be clearly understood by those who may not have fully mastered the language in which the instructions will be given.

    11 It cannot be emphasized enough that all possible access points to the ship and any key and secure areas on it must be secured or controlled in port, at anchor and when underway. Crews should be trained in the use of any additional surveillance or detection equipment installed on the ship. Planning and training must be on the basis that an attack will take place and not in the belief that with some luck it will not happen. Indications to attackers that the ship has an alert and trained crew implementing an anti-attack plan will help to deter them from attacking the ship.

    Precautions at anchor or in port

    12 In areas where attacks occur it is important to limit. record and control those who are allowed access to a ship when in port or at anchor. Photographing those who board the ship can be a useful deterrent or assist the identification of attackers who may have had access to the ship prior to their attack. Film need only be developed in the event of a subsequent attack. Given that attackers may use knowledge of cargo manifests to select their targets. every effort should be made to limit the circulation of documents which give information on the cargoes on board or their location on the ship.

    13 Prior to leaving port the ship should be thoroughly searched and all doors or access points secured or controlled. This is particularly important in the case of the bridge. engine room. steering space and other vulnerable areas. Doors and access points should be regularly checked thereafter. The means of controlling doors or access points which would need to be used in the event of an onboard emergency will need careful consideration. Ship or crew safety should not be compromised.

    Watchkeeping and vigilance

    14 Maintaining vigilance is essential. All too often the first indication of an attack has been when the attackers appear on the bridge or in the master's cabin. Advance warning of a possible attack will give the opportunity to sound alarms. alert other ships and the coastal authorities, illuminate the suspect craft. undertake evasive manoeuvring or initiate other response procedures. Signs that the ship is aware it is being approached can deter attackers,

    15 When ships are in, or approaching areas where attacks take place, bridge watches and look-outs should be doubled. Additional watches on the stern or covering radar "blind spots" should be considered. Companies should consider investing in low-light binoculars for bridge staff and look-outs. Radar should be constantly manned but it may be difficult to detect low profile fast moving craft on ship's radars. A yacht radar mounted on the stern may provide additional radar cover capable of detecting small craft approaching from astern when the ship is underway. Use of an appropriately positioned yacht radar when the vessel is at anchor may also provide warning of the close approach of small craft.

    16 It is particularly important to maintain a radar and visual watch for craft which may be trailing the ship when underway but which could close in quickly when mounting an attack. Small craft which appear to be matching the speed of the ship on a parallel or following course should always be treated with suspicion. When a suspect craft has been noticed, it is important that an effective-all-round watch is maintained for fear the first craft is a decoy with the intention to board the ship from a second craft while attention is focused on the first.

    17 Companies owning ships that frequently visit areas where attacks occur should consider the purchase and use of more sophisticated visual and electronic devices in order to augment both radar and visual watch capability against attackers' craft at night, thereby improving the prospects of obtaining an early warning of a possible attack. In particular, the provision of night vision devices, small radars to cover the blind stern arcs. closed circuit television and physical devices. such as barbed wire, may be considered. In certain circumstances non-lethal weapons, such as CS gas projectiles, may also be appropriate. Infrared detection and alerting equipment may also be utilized.

    Radio procedures

    18 A suitable qualified radio operator should be on duty at all times when ships are in, or approaching, areas where attacks occur. This duty should not be performed by the master though, on occasions, this may be unavoidable.

    19 Prior to entering areas where attacks have occurred, radio operators should practice and perfect all appropriate radio operational procedures and ensure all transmitters, including satellite Ship Earth Stations, are fully operational and available for immediate use on distress and safety frequencies. When a GMDSS installation is provided and "ship's position" data are not automatically updated from an associated electronic navigation aid, radio operators are strongly recommended to enter the ship's position at regular intervals into the appropriate communications equipment manually. Where an INMARSAT Ship Earth Station is provided, it may prove useful to draft and store "standard messages" (see paragraph 27) for ready use in an emergency in either the equipment's memory or on computer disk. Masters should ensure that all procedures to generate a distress alert on any communications equipment are clearly marked on, or near. the equipment and all appropriate crew members briefed on their operation.

    20 Masters should bear in mind the possibility that attackers are monitoring ship-to-shore communications and using intercepted information to select their targets. Caution should. therefore, be exercised when transmitting information on cargo or valuables on board by radio in areas where attacks occur.

    Radio watchkeeping and responses

    21 A constant radio watch should be maintained with the appropriate shore or naval authorities when in areas where attacks have occurred. Continuous watch should also be maintained on all distress and safety frequencies. particularly VHF Channel 16 and 2,182 kHz. Ships should also ensure all maritime safety information broadcasts for the area are monitored. As it is anticipated that INMARSAT's enhanced group calling system (EGC) will normally be used for such broadcasts using the SafetyNET service. owners should ensure a suitably configured EGC receiver is continuously available when in. or approaching. areas where there is risk of attack. Owners should also consider fitting a dedicated receiver for this purpose. i.e. one that is not incorporated into a Ship Earth Station used for commercial purposes to ensure no urgent broadcasts are missed.

    22 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recommends in MSC/Circ.597. issued in August 1992. that reports concerning attacks by pirates or armed robbers should be made to the relevant Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC) for the area. MSC/Circ.597 also recommends that Governments should arrange for the RCCs to be able to pass reports of attacks to the appropriate law enforcement agencies or naval authorities. This action should be taken as quickly as possible.

    23 If suspicious movements are identified which may result in an imminent attack. the ship is advised to contact the relevant RCC. Where the master believes these movements could constitute a direct danger to navigation. consideration should be given to broadcasting an "All Stations (CQ)" "danger message" as a warning to other ships in the vicinity as well as advising the appropriate RCC. A danger message should be transmitted in plain language on a VHF working frequency following an announcement on VHF Channel 70 using the "safety" priority. All such measures shall be preceded by the safety signal (Securite).

    24 When. in his opinion. there is conclusive evidence that the safety of his ship is threatened. the master should immediately contact the relevant RCC and. if considered appropriate. authorize broadcast of an "All Stations" "Urgent Message" on VHF Channel 16. 2.182 kHz. or any other radiocommunications service he considers appropriate; e.g. 500 kHz. INMARSAT. etc. All such messages shall be preceded by the appropriate Urgency signal (PAN PAN) and/or a DSC call on VHF Channel 70 and/or 2.187.5 kHz using the "all ships urgency" category. If the Urgency signal has been used and an attack does not. in fact. develop. the ship should cancel the message as soon as it knows that action is no longer necessary. This message of cancellation should likewise be addressed to "all stations".

    25 Should an attack occur and. in the opinion of the master, the ship or crew are in grave and imminent danger requiring immediate assistance, he should immediately authorize the broadcasting of a distress message, preceded by the appropriate distress alerts (MAYDAY. SOS. DSC. etc.). using all available radiocommunications systems. The appropriate RCC should acknowledge receipt and attempt to establish communications. To minimize delay. if using a ship earth station, ships should ensure the coast earth station associated with the RCC is used.

    26 Masters. should bear in mind that the distress signal is provided for use only in case of imminent danger and its use for less urgent purposes might result in insufficient attention being paid to calls from ships really in need of immediate assistance. Care and discretion must be employed in its use, to prevent its devaluation in the future. Where the transmission of the Distress signal is not fully justified, use should be made of the Urgency signal. The Urgency signal has priority over all communications other than distress.

    Standard message formats

    27 The standard message formats given in appendix 1 should be used for all piracy alert reports. In all cases of suspected or actual pirate attack, IMO and 1MB should invariably be informed so that a reliable set of statistics is compiled and action is taken. as appropriate.


    28 Ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent with safe navigation, having regard in particular to the provisions of Rule 20(b) of the 1972 Collision Regulations. Bow and overside lights should be left on if possible. Ships must not keep on deck lights when underway, as it may lead other ships to assume the ship is at anchor. Wide beam floods could illuminate the area astern of the ship. Signal projector lights can be used systematically to probe for suspect craft using the radar guidance if possible. So far as is practicable crew members on duty outside the ship's secure areas when in port or at anchor should avail themselves of shadow and avoid being silhouetted by deck lights as this may make them targets for seizure by approaching attackers.

    29 It has been suggested that ships should travel blacked out except for mandatory navigation lights. This may prevent attackers establishing points of reference when approaching a ship. In addition, turning on the ship's lights as attackers approach could alert them that they have been seen, dazzle them and encourage them to desist. It is difficult. however. to maintain full blackout on a merchant ship. The effectiveness of this approach will ultimately depend in part on the level of moonlight. but primarily on the vigilance of the ship's crew. While suddenly turning on the ship's light may alarm or dazzle attackers, it could also place the crew at a disadvantage at a crucial point through temporary loss of their night vision. On balance, this approach cannot be recommended.

    Secure areas

    30 In accordance with the ship's anti-attack plan. all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine room, steering gear compartments, officers' cabins and crew accommodation should be secured and controlled at all times and should be regularly inspected. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. Consideration should be given to the installation of special access control systems to the ship's secure areas. Ports, scuttles and windows which could provide access to such secure areas should be securely closed and should have laminated glass. if possible. Deadlights should be shut and clipped tightly. The internal doors within secure areas which give immediate access to key areas such as the bridge, radio office, engine room and master's cabin, should be strengthened and have special access control systems and automatic alarms.

    31 Securing doors providing access to, and egress from. secure or key areas may give rise to concern over safety in the event of an accident. In any situation where there is a conflict between safety and security, the safety requirements should be paramount.. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing accesses and exits to be secured or controlled.

    32 Owners may wish to consider providing closed-circuit television (CCTV) coverage and recording of the main access points to the ship's secure areas, the corridors approaching the entrances to key areas and the bridge.

    33 To prevent seizure of individual crew members by attackers -seizure and threatening a crew member is one of the more common means of attackers gaining control over a ship - all crew members not engaged on essential outside duties should remain within a secure area during the hours of darkness.. Those whose duties necessarily involve working outside such areas at night should remain in constant communication with the bridge and should have practiced using alternative routes to return to a secure area in the event of an attack. Crew members who fear they may not be able to return to a secure area during an attack, should select places in advance in which they can take temporary refuge.

    34 There should be designated muster areas within the ship's secure areas where the crew can muster during an attack and communicate their location and numbers to the bridge.


    35 Alarm signals, including the ship's whistle, should be sounded on the approach of attackers.. Alarms and signs of response can discourage attackers. Alarm signals or announcements which provide an indication at the point at which the attacker may board, or have boarded, may help crew members in exposed locations select the most appropriate route to return to a secure area.

    Use of distress flares

    36 The only flares authorized for carriage on board ship are intended for use if the vessel is in distress and is in need of immediate assistance. As with the unwarranted use of the Distress signal on the radio (see paragraph 26 above), use of distress flares simply to alert shipping rather than to indicate that the vessel is in grave and imminent danger may reduce their effect in the situations in which they are intended to be used and responded to. Radio transmissions should be used to alert shipping of the risk of attacks rather than distress flares. Distress flares should only be used when the master considers that the attackers' actions are putting his ship in imminent danger.

    Evasive manoeuvring and use if hoses

    37 Provided that navigational safety allows, masters should consider "riding off" attackers craft by heavy wheel movements as they approach. The effect of the bow wave and wash may deter would-be attackers and make it difficult for them to attach poles or grappling irons to the ship. Manoeuvres of this kind should not be used in confined or congested waters or close inshore or by vessels constrained by their draught in the confined deep water routes found, for example, in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

    38 The use of water hoses should also be considered though they may be difficult to train if evasive manoeuvring is also taking place. Water pressures of 80 lb per square inch and above have deterred and repulsed attackers. Not only does the attacker have to fight against the jet of water but the flow may swamp his boat and damage engines and electrical systems. Special fittings for training hoses could be considered which would also provide protection for the hose operator. A number of spare fire hoses could be rigged and tied down to be pressurized at short notice if a potential attack is detected.

    39 Employing evasive manoeuvres and hoses must rest on a determination to successfully deter attackers or to delay their boarding to allow all crew members to gain the sanctuary of secure areas. Continued heavy wheel movements with attackers on board may lessen their confidence that they will be able to return safely to their craft and may persuade them to disembark quickly. However, responses of this kind could lead to reprisals by the attackers if they seize crew members and should not be engaged in unless the master is convinced he can use them to advantage and without risk to those on board. They should not be used if the attackers have already seized crew members.


    40 The carrying and use of firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship is strongly discouraged.

    41 Carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an already dangerous situation, and any firearms on board may themselves become an attractive target for an attacker. The use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is great. In some jurisdictions, killing a national may have unforeseen consequences even for a person who believes he has acted in self defence.

    The phase of suspected or attempted piracy attack

    Suspected piracy vessel detected

    42 Early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defence. If the vigilance and surveillance has been successful, a pirate/armed robbery vessel will be detected early. This is the stage at which the law enforcement agencies of the nearest littoral or coastal State must be informed. The ship's crew should be warned and, if not already in their defensive positions, they should move to them. Evasive manoeuvres and noses should be vigorously employed as detailed in the preparation phase.

    Being certain that-piracy will be attempted

    43 If not already in touch with the law enforcement agencies of the littoral coastal State, efforts should be made to establish contact. Crew preparations should be completed and NUC lights should be flashed to warn other vessels in the vicinity that an attack is about to take place. Vigorous manoeuvring should be continued and maximum speed should be sustained if navigation conditions permit.

    Pirate vessel in proximity to. or -in contact with. own vessel

    44 Vigorous use of hoses in the boarding area should be continued, It may be possible to cast off grappling hooks and poles, provided the ship's crew are not put to unnecessary danger.

    Pirates start to board vessel

    45 Timing during this phase will be critical and as soon as it is appreciated that a boarding is inevitable all crew should be ordered to seek their secure positions.

    The piracy attack stage

    46 Pirates have succeeded in entering vessel. Early detection of potential attacks must be the first line of defence, action to prevent the attackers actually boarding the second, but there will be incidents when attackers succeed in boarding a ship, The majority of pirates and armed robbers are opportunists seeking an easy target and time may not be on their side, particularly if the crew are aware they are on board and are raising the alarm. However, the attackers may seek to compensate for the pressure of time they face by escalating their threats or the violence they employ.

    When attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should be aimed at:
      .1 securing the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship;

      .2 seeking to ensure that the crew remain in control of the navigation of the ship; and

      .3 securing the earliest possible departure of the attackers from the ship. 47 The options available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to which the attackers have secured control of the ship, e,g. by having gained access to the bridge or engine room, or by seizing crew members who they can threaten, to force the master or crew to comply with their wishes. However, even if the crew are all safely within secure areas, the master will always have to consider the risk to the ship the attackers could cause outside those areas, e.g, by using firebombs to start fires on a tanker or chemical carrier.

      48 If the master is certain that all his crew are within secure areas and that the attackers cannot gain access or by their actions outside the secure areas they do not place the entire ship at imminent risk, then he may consider undertaking evasive manoeuvres of the type referred to above to encourage the attackers to return to their craft. The possibility of a sortie by a well-organized crew has, in the past, successfully persuaded attackers to leave a ship but the use of this tactic is only appropriate if it can be undertaken at no risk to the crew.

      49 For an action like this to be attempted the master must have clear knowledge of where the attackers are on the ship, that they are not carrying firearms or other potentially lethal weapons and that the number of crew involved significantly outnumbers the attackers they will face. If a sortie party can use water hoses, they-stand an increased chance of success. The intention should be to encourage the attackers back to their craft. Crew members should not seek to come between the attackers and their craft nor should they seek to capture attackers as to do so may increase the resistance the attackers offer which will, in turn, increase the risk faced by members of the sortie party. Once outside the secure area, the sortie party should always stay together. Pursuit of an individual attacker by a lone crew member may be attractive but if it results in the crew member being isolated and seized by the attackers, the advantage turns to the attackers. Crew members should operate together and remain in constant communication with the bridge and should be recalled if their line of withdrawal to a secure area is threatened.

      50 If the crew do apprehend an attacker, he should be placed in secure confinement and well cared for. Arrangements should be made to transfer him to the custody of law enforcement officers or naval authorities of a coastal State at the earliest possible opportunity. Any evidence relating to this activities should also be handed over to the authorities who take him into custody.

      The pirates begin to gain control and take one or more 0f the ship's crew into their custody

      51 If the attackers have gained control of the engine room or bridge, have seized crew members or can pose an imminent threat to the safety of a ship, the master or officer in charge should remain calm and, if possible, seek to negotiate with the attackers with the intention of maintaining the crew's control over the navigation of the ship, the safe return of any hostages they may hold and the early departure of the attackers from the ship. There will be many circumstances when compliance with the attackers' demands will be the only safe alternative and when resistance or obstruction of any kind could be both futile and dangerous.

      52 In the event of attackers gaining temporary control of the vessel, crew members should, if it is safe and practicable, leave Close Circuit Television (CCTV) records running.

      53 As there have been occasions when entire crews have been locked up, consideration should be given to secreting equipment within areas in which the crew could be detained to facilitate their early escape.

      The pirates have stolen property/money. etc.

      54 At this stage it is essential that the pirates are assured that they have been given everything they demand and a strong reassurance that nothing has been secreted may persuade the pirates to leave.

      The pirates start to disembark from the vessel

      55 If the crew are in their secure positions, it would be unwise of them to leave this security until it is confirmed that the pirates have left the ship. A pre-arranged signal on the ship's siren will alert the crew to the "all clear".

      The pirates have disembarked from the vessel

      Action after an attack and reporting incidents

      56 An immediate post attack report should be made to the relevant RCC and. through them. to the law enforcement agencies or naval authorities of the coastal State concerned. As well as information on the identity and location of the ship. any injuries to crew members or damage to the ship should be reported as should the direction in which the attackers departed together with brief details of their numbers and. if possible, a description of their craft. If the crew have apprehended an attacker. that should also be reported in this report,

      57 If an attack has resulted in the death of, or serious injury to. any person on board the ship or serious damage to the ship itself. an immediate report should also be sent to the ship's maritime Administration. In any event a report of ah attack is vital if follow-up action is to be taken by the ship's maritime Administration.

      58 Any CCTV or other recording of the incident should be secured. If practicable. areas that have been damaged or rifled should be secured and remain untouched by crew members pending possible forensic examination by the law enforcement agencies of a coastal State. Crew members who came into contact with the attackers should be asked to prepare an individual report on their experience noting. in particular. any distinguishing features which could help subsequent identification of the attackers. A full inventory, including a description of any personal possessions or equipment taken. with serial numbers when known. should also be prepared.

      59 As soon as possible after the incident. a fuller report should be transmitted to the authorities of the coastal State in whose waters the attack occurred or. if on the high seas. to the authorities of the nearest coastal State. Due and serious consideration should be given to complying with any request made by the competent authorities of the coastal State to allow law enforcement officers to board the vessel. take statements from crew members and undertake forensic and other investigations. Copies of any CCTV recordings. photographs. etc. should be provided if they are available.

      60 Any report transmitted to a coastal State should also be transmitted to the ship's maritime Administration at the earliest opportunity. A complete report of the incident. including details of any follow-up action that was taken or difficulties that may have been experienced. should eventually be submitted to the ship's maritime Administration.

      61 The report received by maritime Administrations may be used in any diplomatic approaches made by the flag State to the Government of the coastal State in which the incident occurred. This will also provide the basis for the report to IMO.

      62 The format required for reports to IMO is attached at appendix 1. Indeed. at present the lack of adequate and accurate reporting of attacks is directly affecting the ability of secure governmental and international action. Reports may also contribute to future refining and updating any advice that might be issued to ships.

      63 Reports to the RCC, coastal State and the ship's maritime Administration should also be made if an attack has been unsuccessful.

      64 It is hoped that using RCCs, as recommended by IMO in MSC/Circ.597, will eliminate communication difficulties.

      Jurisdiction and intervention

      Criminal jurisdiction

      65 Piracy is an offence committed on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State. A pirate who has been apprehended on the high seas, therefore, falls to be dealt with under the law of the flag State of his captors.

      On leaving piracy threat areas

      66 On leaving piracy threat areas, shipmasters should make certain that those stowages that need to be unlocked for safety reasons are unlocked, unring hoses and revert to normal watch keeping/lighting.

      67 A summary of the piracy phases and how they may, or may not, develop is given in appendix 2.

      Appendix 1 Message

      Report 1 -Initial message -Piracy attack alert

      1. Ship's name and callsign/INMARSAT ID (plus ocean region code)

      MAYDAY (see note)


      2. Ship's position (and time of position UTC)

      3. Nature of event


      It is expected that this message will he a Distress Message because the ship or persons will be in grave or imminent danger when under attack. Where this is not the case. the word MAYDAY is to be omitted.

      Use of distress priority (3) in the INMARSAT system will not require MAYDAY to be included.

      Report 2 - Initial message -Piracy attack alert

      1 Ship's name and callsign

      2 Reference initial PIRACY ALERT

      3 Position of incident

      4 Details of incident. e.g.:
      Method of attack
      Description of suspect craft
      Number and brief description of pirates
      Injuries to crew
      Damage to ship
      Brief details of stolen property/cargo

      6. Last observed movements of pirate/suspect craft. e.g.:

      7. Assistance required

      8. Preferred communications with reporting ship. e.g.:
      Appropriate Coast Radio Station
      INMARSAT ID (plus ocean region code)

      9. Date/time of report (UTC)

      Appendix 2 "Phases" related to voyages in piracy threat areas

      Phase Phase
      Symbol Description
      A Approaching a piracy threat area (1 hour prior to entering)
      B Entering a piracy threat area
      C Inside a piracy threat area, but no suspect piracy vessel detected
      D Inside a piracy threat area: suspect piracy vessel detected
      E Certainty that piracy will be attempted
      F Pirate vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own vessel
      G Pirates start attempts to enter ship
      H Pirates have succeeded in entering ship
      I Pirates have one or more of the ship's personnel in their control/custody
      J The pirates have gained access to the bridge or the master's office
      K The pirates have stolen property/money etc
      L The pirates start to disembark
      M The pirates have disembarked
      N The pirate vessel is no longer in contact with the ship
      O Own ship leaves the piracy threat area
      Naar boven