2.2.1 Systems should be assigned a safety class,
based upon the importance of the consequences of the loss of the function
performed by the system. Requirements for materials, design, construction,
testing, inspection and operation should reflect the assigned safety
classification. The following typical allocation of safety classes is for
general guidance only and is not intended to be a definitive requirement.
2.2.2 Safety class 1 (SC-1)
applies to the following items:
.1 Reactor
Protection system and the scram system;
.2 The
pressure vessel and components of or with in the primary pressure boundary
and core support structure whose failure could cause a PPC 3 or 4.
Components connected to the reactor coolant system and forming part of the
primary pressure boundary, need not be assigned to SC-1 , provided that:
.2.1 for Postulated fail use of the component during normal
reactor operation, the reactor can be shut down and cooled down in an
orderly manner assuming ma he-up is provided by the reactor coolant make-up
system only; or
.2.2 the component is or can be
isolated from the reactor coolant system by two valves. Each open valve must
be capable of automatic actuation. The closure time should be such that in
the event of postulated failure of the component during normal reactor
operation , each valve remains operable and the reactor can be shut down and
cooled down. in an orderly manner; and
.3 The steam
generator shell and Main piping including the isolating valves on the steam
line.
2.2.3 Safety class 2 SC-21
applies to the following items:
.1 Components of
primary pressure boundary not covered by SC-1 ;
.2
Containment structure and its safety systems;
.3
Components and systems or subsystems which are necessary to:
.3.1 remove residual heat from the core under PPC 2,3 or 4
occurrences;
.3.2 control radioactivity released
within the containment structure;
.3.3 control
hydrogen within the containment after a loss of coolant accident;
.3.4 cool the core in an emergency (ECCS including
emergency electrical power supply . accumulators, coolant tanks, etc.);
.3.5 cool the containment and/or suppress the
pressure after loss of coolant accident;
.3.6 make
up reactor coolant, as a safely function; and
.3.7
ensure any other function which may have results of similar importance to
safety;
.4 Energy supply systems of the reactor
protection system;
.5 Control rod drive and supply
systems;
.6 Air clean-up system for the containment
structure, including any portions of the clean-up system , external to the
containment structure, that act as an extension of the containment structure
boundary during clean-up recirculation;
.7 Primary
over pressure protection and primary blow-down system, not covered by SC-1;
and
.8 As determined by the Administration and
recorded in the Safety Assessment. other ship equipment whose failure could
directly cause a PPC 3 event affecting the NSSS.
2.2.4 Safety class 3 (SC-3) applies to the
following items:
.1 Any safety system of the NSSS
or portion thereof not covered by SC-1 or SC-2;
.2
Ancillary systems that Provide support for safety systems, such as:
lubricating oil systems, hydraulic systems, seawater coolant circuits,
compressed air systems, and fuel oil systems for ECCs emergency power
generators;
.3 Seawater coolant circuits,
fulfilling safety functions required to satisfy criterion B; and
.4 Systems that are not safety systems but whose
failure would result in an unacceptable release, to the environment, of
gaseous radioactive material , which would normally be held for time decay.
Waste processing systems and purification circuits of the make-up loop are
examples.
2.2.5 Safety class
4(SC4) applies to the following items:
.1 Secondary
steam and feedwater systems that form part of the heat removal system and
are located outside the containment structure beyond the second isolation
valve, provided that an alternative redundant and independent system is
available to transport heat to an ultimate heat sink;
.2 Turbines and condensers, including reactor-fed turbo
generators not covered by SC-1,2, or 3, where required to act as heat sinks;
.3 Structure for the safety enclosure, the
structure for collision protection and the structure in way of the reactor.
except where covered by SC-3;
.4 Other ship
equipment whose failure could directly cause a PPC 2 event;
.5 NSSS components not covered by SC-1,2 or 3.
2.2.6 Safely class assignment should be
determined by system evaluation on a case-by-case basis, stated in the
Safety Assessment, and should be approved by the Administration .
2.2.7 Within each safety class,
every system or component should be assigned an appropriate design class,
ranging from DC-1 to DC-4. Each design class defines specific standards of
design, manufacture and quality assurance that are commensurate with the
effect of failure of the system or component on the safety of the ship.
2.2.8 Design class 1 (DC-1)
requires application of the highest standards of design and quality
assurance. and includes the following provisions:
.1 For pressure retaining components, design requirements
should be based upon the following considerations:
.1.1 load
conditions, including:
.1.1.1 steady pressure loads;
.1.1.2 pressure transient during manoeuvring, shutdown or
startup;
.1.1.3 pressure fluctuations due to inertial
forces caused by extreme ship motions for all design sea states (see 2.3);
.1.1.4 steady and transient thermal loads;
.1.1.5 dynamic forces arising from loss of coolant
accidents, acting on the primary system pressure boundary, its internals and
its supporting structure;
.1.1.6 dynamic forces caused by
pipe whip or a double ended pipe rupture;
.1.1.7 dynamic
forces arising from any other accident postulated under PPC 3 or 4;
.1.1.8 ship-induced vibration effects;
.1.1.9 inertial forces from ship motions in a seaway, defined in table 2.1
for SC-1 ;
.1.1.10 continued operation when the ship is
experiencing a static list of up to 30° or rolling angles of up to 45° or is
inclined up to 10° either in the fore or aft direction , or is in any
combination of angles within those limits. These angles may be reduced if it
can be proven to the satisfaction of the Administration that the ship does
not experience such attitudes, in which case the allowed reduction should be
shown in the Safety Assessment;
.1.1.11 ensuring that
their integrity is preserved at all angles of inclination;
.1.2 detailed stress analysis, to detect local bending and
local peak stress under the load conditions referred to in .1.1 above;
.1.3 response analyses, with respect to dynamic
loads from a seaway, pipe rupture accident, action of quick closing valves,
and forced vibration from shipborne sources;
.1.4
for application of .1.3 above, relatively low damping factors should be
assumed and where it can be proven to the satisfaction of the Administration
that no significant resonance effects are possible, response analysis for
ship vibrations may be waived;
.1.5 detailed
analyses of brittle and ductile fracture beheaviour, assessment of fatigue
and crack propagation and evaluation of allowances for acceptable flaws -
the effects of radiation should be included in the analyses;
.1.6 in material selection;
.1.6.1 sufficiently high strength and ductility;
.1.6.2
proven fracture toughness values;
.1.6.3 developed
knowledge of crack growth rates; and
.1.7 extensive
testing of materials to Prove the properties referred to in.1.6 above and
supervision of important tests by a qualified surveyor;
.2 Pressure-retaining shells and components of pumps and motors
that are highly stressed - i.e. where the principal stress tends towards the
maximum allowable stress value - should allow for unrestricted
non-destructive testing, during periodic surveys, to detect and monitor
flaws and cracks in their surface and body volume;
.3 Pressure-retain ins shells should;
.3.1 be
welded with full penetration welds;
.3.2 have
supporting structures, nozzles and standpipes integral with the shell;
.3.3 have reinforcement of openings and flanges
adequate to maintain design stresses; and
.3.4 be
generally designed and constructed to well established procedures and be of
the highest quality.
.4 DC-1 components, other than
pressure-retaining components, should be designed and constructed to the
satisfaction of the Administration if not otherwise defined and should be of
a quality commensurate with their importance to safety .
2.2.9 Design class 2 (DC-2) requires that
components assigned to this class meet a high standard of design and quality
assurance, including the Provisions of the following paragraphs:
.1 Loads applied to pressure-retaining structures
and to their supports and to machinery components whose principal stress
tends towards the maximum allowable stress value, should include the sum of
static and dynamic. influences due to Process variables and ship motions in
a seaway. As a minimum requirement, normal accelerations supplemented by
load factors to account for other dynamic effects, should be applied;
.2 Stress analysis, where necessary, should follow
relevant rules and. standards. Normally, scantlings should follow the
requirements of the Administration, or of an organization duly recognized by
the Administration. Piping should be analysed for temperature loads where
temperatures exceed 120° and for static reaction to pressure, using dynamic
load factors when considering inertia loads from dead weight and ship
motions. Small diameter piping should satisfy the requirements of the
Administration;
.3 Response analysis for piping
systems need be carried out only where high or low temperature limits set in
relevant codes or standards are exceeded, or in those cases involving
particular accident conditions that require proven component reliability;
.4 Material choice , material testing and
surveys should follow the requirements for the highest class boilers and
pressure vessels, that are applied by the Administration or an organization
duly authorized by it;
.5 Design and construction
procedures should follow general experience in pressure vessel and piping
design for ships, following the requirements for high temperature steam
piping set by the Administration or an organization duly authorized by It:
and
.6 The pressure-retaining shell of the
containment structure should be designed to withstand :
.6.1
pressure and temperature variations arising from a loss of coolant accident,
combined with stresses due to ship motions in a seaway defined in table 2.1
for SC-2; and
.6.2 pressure differences occurring
during sinking of the ship and pressure differences due to subsequent
flooding of the containment structure at a temperature of 4°.
2.2.10 Design class 3 (DC-3)
should correspond to the same design standards as those used for ship
boilers and steam piping, tool lowing the requirements of the Administration
or an organization duly authorized by it.
2.2.11 Design class 4 (DC-4) should follow international and
national standards for design, construction and testing. considering the
inertial forces acting on components.
2.2.12 Design class assignment should be determined by system
evaluation on a case-by-case basis and should be approved by the
Administration.
2.2.13 Design
classes do not necessarily correspond numerically with safely
classes.